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Abstract—Power systems are moving towards hybrid AC/DC
grids with the integration of HVDC links, renewable resources
and energy storage modules. New models of frequency control
have to consider the complex interactions between these com-
ponents. Meanwhile, more attention should be paid to cyber
security concerns as these control strategies highly depend on
data communications which may be exposed to cyber attacks. In
this regard, this article aims to analyze the false data injection
(FDI) attacks on the AC/DC interconnected system with virtual
inertia and develop advanced diagnosis tools to reveal their
occurrence. We build an optimization-based framework for the
purpose of vulnerability and attack impact analysis. Considering
the attack impact on the system frequency stability, it is shown
that the hybrid grid with parallel AC/DC links and emulated
inertia is more vulnerable to the FDI attacks, compared with the
one without virtual inertia and the normal AC system. We then
propose a detection approach to detect and isolate each FDI
intrusion with a sufficient fast response, and even recover the
attack value. In addition to theoretical results, the effectiveness
of the proposed methods is validated through simulations on
the two-area AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia
emulation capabilities.
Index Terms—AC/DC system, virtual inertia emulation, fre-
quency control, false data injection attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT advances in power electronics have made HVDClinks and renewable energy resources (RES) more pop-
ular in power system applications [1]. To better support the
frequency control in the modern scenarios, several efforts
have been carried out to develop different approaches for
inertia emulation tasks [2], [3]. Besides, this transformation
does not only lead to more adaptation of conventional control
schemes such as the primary and secondary frequency control
to handle complex interactions between these components, but
also introduce an increasing dependence on data communi-
cations. The new model of frequency control must consider
hybrid AC/HVDC multi-area systems incorporating virtual
inertia emulators [4]. Besides, such control process would
also rely heavily on communication networks and numerous
cyber devices to achieve reliable and in-time data exchange.
However, the corresponding communication channels are lack
of sufficient cyber security mechanisms, and the wide com-
munication surface of the hybrid AC/DC grids makes them
more exposed to cyber intrusions, including false data injection
(FDI) attacks [5], [6]. Notably, as we know, the DC grid has
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a low tolerance to a fault; if a single fault can mislead a fast
response, so as an attack. Indeed, a deliberate attacker can
result in severe consequences on system frequency stability
[7]. Thus one need advanced tools to understand the attack
strategies and detect them sufficiently fast in the context of
AC/DC interconnected system which is also facilitated by
inertia emulators.
A. Related Work
Nowadays, the matter of virtual inertia is one of the hottest
topics in the power system studies [8], [9]. Different methods
for inertia emulation have been proposed for the integration
of RES into the power grid by using Energy Storage Sys-
tems (ESS) [10]. In the AC/DC interconnected system, the
dynamic effects of these components in the inertia emulation
process need to be reflected in the high-level frequency control
loop, which also highlights the importance of cyber-secure
data communications [11]. We can see that many research
activities have been done on the cyber security issues of
pure AC power systems. Vulnerability and impact analysis
of the AC grid to cyber attacks can be found in [12], [13].
For the detection of FDI attacks which corrupt the frequency
stability, model-based detectors have emerged mainly from
observer-based approaches in the framework of differential-
algebraic equations (DAEs) [14]. For instance, in [15] an
unknown input observer was employed to detect FDI attacks
on the conventional multi-area AC systems. To be noted, these
observers for attack detection usually have the same degree
as the system dynamics, which can cause troubles in the
online implementation especially for large-scale systems [16].
Other FDI attack detectors may come from statistical methods
which always have prior assumptions on the distribution of
measurement errors [17].
For the hybrid AC/DC grid with virtual inertia, however,
there are still very few studies that have focused on its
cyber security research [18]. To do that, it requires extensive
knowledge on the dynamics of the complex AC/DC system
with emulated inertia and also methods or algorithms for cyber
security analysis. The work in [19] studied the effect of attacks
on the HVDC system and impact on the dynamic voltage
stability, and proposed a predictive control based method
to detect these attacks. The authors in [20] demonstrated
mechanisms by which an attacker could cause system-wide
unstable oscillations via loads with emulated inertia control.
Recently, the literature [21] studied the possible impact of FDI
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2attacks on the secondary frequency control of low inertia grid
under deregulated power systems, and proposed a detection
mechanism based on the load forecasts, by ensuring the
availability and accuracy of such additional data. To conclude,
for vulnerability and impact analysis, more efforts are still
needed to learn the optimal FDI attack strategies especially in
the context of AC/DC interconnected multi-area system with
emulated inertia. Besides, a low-order diagnosis tool for a fast
response in the presence of FDI attacks is more preferred in
practice. To the best of our knowledge, the following question
is still not answered sufficiently,
Would it be possible to quantify the vulnerability and impact
of the FDI attacks on the AC/DC interconnected system with
emulated inertia, and propose a diagnosis tool to detect such
malicious intrusions in time?
B. Contributions and Outline
In this article we aim to address the question above. For
this purpose, we would first build the frequency dynamics
model for the AC/DC interconnected system with virtual
inertia emulation capabilities. A high-level control structure is
presented, which also illustrates possible vulnerable points of
the system to FDI attacks. Next, we introduce impact indices
to evaluate the effects of FDI attacks on the frequency stability.
We formulate an optimization-based framework to assess the
vulnerability of the AC/DC interconnected system to the FDI
attacks. In the end, a detector in the form of residual generator
with adjustable design parameters is proposed to detect, isolate
and even recover each FDI intrusion. The main contributions
of this article are:
(i) Unlike many existing literature, we go beyond the study
on the normal AC system that we explore the vulnerabil-
ity and impact of the AC/DC interconnected system with
emulated inertia to the FDI attacks. A well-constructed
optimization-based framework is built to analyze the
optimal attack strategies on achieving undetectability and
desired impact. From both the theoretical analysis and
numerical results, we have pointed out that the hybrid
AC/DC system with virtual inertial can be more vulnera-
ble to FDI attacks, compared with the one without virtual
inertia and the conventional AC system.
(ii) We further explore the attack detection problem in the
AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia. Differ-
ent from observer-based approaches or other prediction-
based techniques, we formulate a type of residual gener-
ator that can have adjustable design parameters for fast
responses in attack detection. It is guaranteed that the re-
sulting residual signal is decoupled from the system states
(e.g., frequency dynamics) and normal load disturbances,
and can recover the attack magnitude in the steady-state
value of the residual. We also provide attack isolation
method together with conditions of attack detectability
and isolability.
In Section II, we describe the frequency dynamics model
of the AC/DC interconnected system with emulated inertia,
and vulnerable points are illustrated in the high-level control
structure. Section III introduces the FDI attack and its optimal
strategy to be disruptive and stealthy. Besides, we propose an
optimization-based framework to analyze the vulnerability and
impact of the system to such attacks. The FDI attack detection
approach is developed in Section IV where we also show its
capabilities of attack isolation and recovery. Finally, numerical
results are reported in Section V.
II. HYBRID AC/DC SYSTEM MODELING
In this section, the frequency dynamics model in a high-
level control structure is presented to simulate and analyze the
behaviour of the hybrid AC/DC interconnected system with
inertia emulation capabilities.
A. The concept of virtual inertia
For the inertia emulation task, one effective way is to
use the derivation of the system frequency proportionally to
adjust the active power reference of a converter. Then the
emulated inertia can contribute to improve the performance
of the system dynamics on the inertia response. This control
concept is the derivative control which calculates the rate of
change of frequency (ROCOF), and can be described as
∆Pemu = kaωo∆ω˙ , (1)
where ∆Pemu is the power reference, ωo is the nominal
frequency and ∆ω is the frequency deviation, and ka denotes
the inertial proportional conversion gain which can be selected
according to an iterating tuning approach for minimizing the
frequency deviations; we refer to [22] for more details.
B. AC/DC interconnected system with emulated inertia
The diagram of an exemplary two-area system with parallel
AC/DC links and added bulk ESS for providing virtual inertia
is presented in Figure 1. In this test system, two converters
are added as interfaces for controlling the behavior of the
ESS modules in accordance with HVDC coordination and
secondary frequency control signals to reduce the deviations
of system frequency during contingencies. The wide-area
frequency and AC/DC power flow measurements are collected
in each area and tie-line, and sent to the control center via
communication networks for the HVDC coordination and
secondary frequency control operation. Note that instead of
these external measurements, the virtual inertial emulation
is using the local information only, which implies a faster
response. The external measurements are transmitted through
dedicated communication networks whose protocols (e.g.,
DNP3, IEC61850) are usually not equipped with adequate
cyber security features [23]. Considering the vulnerabilities
within these communication channels, attack scenarios of this
article mainly focus on the uploading paths of wide-area
measurements, as depicted in Figure 1.
Next, we describe the frequency dynamics model of the
two-area AC/DC interconnected system with ESS for inertia
emulation. It should be noted that in this article a high-
level control structure is adopted to reflect the primary and
secondary frequency control properties based on [24]. This
control structure is illustrated in Figure 2. Thus as we can
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Figure 1: The configuration of the two-area system with parallel AC/DC links and bulk ESS. Since the communication network
between the transducers and the control center is very vulnerable, the FDI attacks of this article are mainly launched on the
uploading channels (the red lines) of wide-area frequency and AC/DC power flow measurements [21].
see from Figure 2, the frequency deviation of Area i in the
Laplace domain can be expressed as
∆ωi(s) =
Kpi
1 + sTpi
[
∆Pmi −∆PLi − (∆PACi,j
+ ∆PDCi,j + ∆PESSi)
]
,
(2)
where ∆PESSi and ∆Pmi are the emulated power from ESS
and the total active power from all generation units (GENs)
within Area i, i.e., ∆Pmi =
∑Gi
g=1 ∆Pmi,g where Gi denotes
the number of participated GENs. Kpi is the system gain and
Tpi is the system time constant. The total load variation is
mentioned by ∆PLi in Area i, while ∆PACi,j and ∆PDCi,j
are the AC and DC power flow deviations between Area i and
Area j, respectively. We can further have
∆Pmi,g (s) =
1
1 + sTchi,g
[ ∆ωi
Ri,g × 2pi − φi,g∆Pagci
]
, (3)
∆PACi,j (s) =
Tij
s
[
∆ωi −∆ωj
]
. (4)
In (3) and (4), Ri,g denotes the droop of each generation
unit, Tchi,g is the overall time constant of the turbine-governor
model, ∆Pagci is the output signal from the secondary control
of Area i for power reference of each generation unit, φi,g is an
area participating factor, and Tij denotes the power coefficient
of the AC line between Area i and Area j.
To model the HVDC link, we use the concept of Supplemen-
tary Power Modulation Controller (SPMC). As illustrated in
Figure 2, the SPMC can be designed as a high-level damping
controller whose inputs consist of deviations of frequencies in
the interconnected areas and the deviation of the transmitted
power in the AC line. Then the output of SPMC is used for
the HVDC link to generate the desired DC power. Thus the
coordinated control strategy acting as a supplementary power
modulation for this DC link can be described by
∆PDCref = Ki∆ωi +Kj∆ωj +KAC∆PACi,j , (5)
∆PDCi,j (s) =
1
1 + sTDC
∆PDCref , (6)
where ∆PDCref denotes the desired DC power reference for
the HVDC line , TDC is the time constant of the DC link, and
Ki, Kj and KAC are used as control gains.
For the inertia emulation process, according to the control
law in Section II-A, the deviation of active power output from
the ESS in each area, namely ∆PESSi , can be written as
∆PESSi(s) =
Jemi
1 + sTESSi
[s∆ωi(s)] , (7)
where TESSi is the time constant of the derivative-based
components. Notably, in practice, the derivative based control
strategy might be sensitive to the noises especially during
the measurements of frequency signals. Therefore, a low-
pass filter can be added to the model for eliminating the
effects of noises. In this study, the dynamics of such a filter
with storage elements is considered by the time constant
TESSi . From (7), there will be two gains (Jem1and Jem2 )
representing the virtual inertia for these two areas. As stated
in Section II-A, the values of these two gains can be obtained
from the iterating optimization approach in [22]. For the
inertia emulation control of this article, it is assumed that we
have enough energy stored in the DC side of the converter
station, and the stored energy is only used for a short period
of time (2 s to 5 s) to provide virtual inertia. Besides, we
have simplified the ESS model in this article that only its
dynamic effects on the high-level frequency control has been
considered. The detail of state of the charge is not modeled
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Figure 2: A high-level control structure for the frequency
dynamics of the two-area AC/DC interconnected system with
ESS for inertia emulation.
but its value is assumed to be always brought back close to
the higher limit during off-peak period.
The part of secondary frequency control calculates the Area
Control Error (ACE) of Area i. The ACE signal now contains
the deviations of frequency in that area and both AC/DC power
flows, and acts as an input for the integral control action,
ACEi =
βi
2pi
∆ωi + (∆PACi,j + ∆PDCi,j ) , (8)
∆Pagci = KIi
ACEi
s
, (9)
where βi is the frequency bias and KIi represents the integral
gain of the secondary frequency controller. Thus finally, based
on the equations (2) to (9), the frequency dynamics model
of the high-level control for the exemplary two-area AC/DC
interconnected system with emulated inertia can be presented
as the following state equation,
X˙(t) = AcX(t) + Bc,dd(t) . (10)
where X ∈ RnX represents the vector of all state variables
and d ∈ Rnd is the system input of load variations, namely,
X :=
[
∆ω1 ∆ω2 ∆Pm1,1 ∆Pm1,2 ∆Pm2,1 ∆Pm2,2 ∆Pagc1
∆Pagc2 ∆PAC1,2 ∆PDC1,2 ∆PESS1 ∆PESS2
]>
,
d =
[
∆PL1 ∆PL2
]>
.
Besides, Ac and Bc,d are constant matrices. Overall, in the
two-area AC/DC interconnected system which also has two
inertia emulators, there are three new state variables (∆PDC1,2 ,
∆PESS1 and ∆PESS2 ) of synchronous controllers that would
be added, compared with the normal AC system. In addition
to (10), we can also derive an output model where the wide-
area measurements of frequencies and AC/DC power flows are
available in the control center of Figure 1. Thus we can have
Y (t) = CX(t) , (11)
where Y ∈ RnY represents the system output and C is the
output matrix. For the purpose of numerical analysis, (10) and
(11) need to be discretized. To obtain the analytical solution for
the discretization, the matrices A and Bd of sampled discrete-
time model with a sampling-period Ts become [25],
A = eAcTs , Bd =
∫ Ts
t=0
eAc(Ts−t)Bc,ddt . (12)
III. FDI ATTACKS ON THE HYBRID AC/DC SYSTEM
As discussed in the proceeding, we consider a high-level
structure of control and security for frequency dynamics of
the multi-area AC/DC system with virtual inertia.
A. FDI attack basics: vulnerability and impact
An FDI attack can modify the wide-area measurements to
a lower or higher value. Thus the system output discrete-time
model under FDI attacks can be described by
Y˜ [k] = CX[k] + f [k] , (13)
where Y˜ [·] is the corrupted output and f [·] denotes FDI
attacks. In this article, we mainly consider the general “station-
ary” FDI attack where it occurs as a constant bias injection f
at an unknown time instance kmin. Other scenarios such as
scaling, ramp, pulse and random attacks are referred to [17].
These corruptions on the outputs would affect the dynamics
of the controllers and consequently the involved system. As
shown in Figure 1, the FDI attacks are mainly on the wide-
area frequency and AC/DC power flow measurements, which
would corrupt the HVDC coordination and the secondary
frequency control. Recall that the inertia emulation is using
local measurements only and thus not attacked. Hence for
instance, an FDI attack on the AC power flow measurement
between Areas i and j, say fACi,j , can manipulate both the
SPMC control and the secondary frequency control loops.
Thus this attack can change (5) and (8) into the following
equations respectively,
∆PDCref = Ki∆ωi +Kj∆ωj +KAC(∆PACi,j + fACi,j ) ,
ACEi =
βi
2pi
∆ωi + (∆PACi,j + fACi,j + ∆PDCi,j ) .
Thus the state equation under FDI attacks in the discrete-time
mode can be expressed as
X[k + 1] = AX[k] + Bdd[k] + Bff [k] , (14)
where the matrix Bf relates FDI attacks to the system states.
Note Bf is obtained through the same matrix transformation
as Bd in (12), while the matrix Bc,f in the continuous system
model depends on the specific attack scenario.
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Figure 3: The MFD of Area 1 under various values of a univariate attack fAC1,2 . The red line indicates the MFD limit for
having a disruptive FDI attack.
Remark III.1 (Vulnerability of different system models under
FDI attacks). Consider the frequency dynamics models of the
following systems under FDI attacks,
• normal AC system,
• AC/DC interconnected system,
• AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia.
We can see that, different from the pure AC system, the
hybrid AC/DC interconnected system with emulated inertia
would have more vulnerable points to FDI attacks. Intruders
can manipulate the wide-area measurements of frequencies
and both AC and DC power flows. Besides, according to
the high-level control structure, corruptions on these wide-
area measurements can affect both the SPMC control and the
secondary frequency control loops. In Section V-B we would
present such a detailed analysis.
An advanced FDI attacker also considers the impact of
various attack strategies. The frequency properties that can
be influenced by the attacker are mainly maximum (center-of-
inertia) frequency deviation (MFD) or steady-state frequency
deviation (SSFD). In this article, we use the former MFD
during the transients as the attack impact index. Intuitively,
for a univariate FDI attack where only one measurement is
compromised, a larger constant injection is more desired to
cause the maximum damage. In this article, the attack is
said to be disruptive to the system when the impact index
MFD arrives at a certain value. For instance, in Figure 3, this
(absolute) value is selected to be 0.8 Hz, as it may mislead to
trigger a possible load shedding scheme when the frequency
reaches 59.2 Hz (for a 60 Hz system) according to [26]. In
Figure 3, we can see that with the increase of the univariate
attack value, the MFD becomes larger. To be disruptive,
it can be inferred from Figure 3 that the univariate attack
value on the AC power flow measurement of the two-area
AC/DC interconnected system with emulated inertia should be
a minimum of 0.44 p.u. (for the base of 100 MW), while it is
0.52 p.u. in the AC/DC system without virtual inertia. These
values are obtained by simulations of the frequency dynamics
model under the univariate attack fAC1,2 .
B. Disruptive stealthy FDI attack strategies
The univariate attack for a large impact in Figure 3 may
be detectable since it may go beyond possible thresholds and
trigger data quality alarms. An intelligent attack should attend
to pursue a desired impact and also satisfy the undetectability
criterion [27]. For that purpose, the attacker is required to have
vast attack resources to manipulate multiple data channels (i.e.,
multivariate attacks) and enough knowledge of the targeted
system operations the parameters of the frequency dynamics
model in Section II and also the data quality checking pro-
grams). Then the attacker can select “appropriate” injection
values. This ensures that the worst-case attack scenario is
considered in the vulnerability analysis. The vulnerability of
a multi-area system to such optimal attacks can be quantified
by computing the attack resources needed by the attacker to
achieve the targets on attack impact and undetectability, which
is formalized in the following definition.
Definition III.2 (Vulnerability to disruptive stealthy attacks).
Consider an FDI attack with f . We call it a disruptive stealthy
attack if f takes values from the set
F :=
{
f ∈ RnY : bmin ≤ F ff ≤ bmax
}
, (15)
where the vectors bmin, bmax ∈ Rnb and the matrix Ff ∈
Rnb×nY are scenario specific. The following Remark III.3
shows that the choice of bmin, bmax, Ff may be adjusted ac-
cording to different national grid codes. Thus, to describe the
vulnerability of multi-area systems to the disruptive stealthy
attacks, one can formulate an optimization program to com-
pute the needed attack resources by the attacker to achieve its
6targets on attack impact and undetectability,
α?i := min
f
‖f ‖0
s.t. f ∈ F , f(i) = µ, (16)
f(j) = 0, for all j ∈ P.
where ‖ ·‖0 denotes the zero vector norm (the number of non-
zero elements in a vector), f(i) is the injection with value
µ on a specific measurement that the attacker can already
access. We also add the constraint that some well-protected
data channels (in the set P) cannot be attacked. The multi-
area system is more vulnerable to the attack with a smaller
α?i as it requires fewer data channels to be manipulated to
achieve its targets on attack impact and undetectability.
The optimization program (16) is NP-hard. We can use the
big M method to express (16) as a mixed integer linear pro-
gram (MILP) which can be solved by appropriate solvers. We
omit the details and refer to [12] for a similar reformulation.
Remark III.3 (bmin, bmax and Ff selection for disruptive
stealthy attacks). For an effective attack strategy, the selection
of parameters bmin, bmax and Ff in (15) are critical. To
be precise, the disruptive stealthy attacks need to satisfy the
following criteria [15], [17],
(i) To avoid triggering data quality alarms, the frequency
deviation after attack corruptions should remain within a
range,
∆ωmin ≤ ∆ωi,f ≤ ∆ωmax ,
(ii) The calculated ACE of Area i during attacks, ACEi,f ,
should not exceed a permitted value,
|ACEi,f | ≤ ACEmax ,
(iii) Similarly, the computed power reference signal for the
HVDC link under FDI attack, ∆PDCref,f , should not
exceed an acceptable value,
|∆PDCref,f | ≤ ∆PDCref,max ,
(iv) To be disruptive to the frequency stability, the MFD after
FDI corruptions should reach a certain value.
It is worth mentioning that the limits of (i) - (iv) are system
dependent as reflected in the different national grid codes.
In this article, the values of ∆ωmin, ∆ωmax, ACEmax and
∆PDCref,max in (i) - (iii) are set to be −0.1 Hz, 0.1 Hz,
0.05 p.u. and 0.1 p.u. respectively, according to the references
[28]–[31]. For (iv), as mentioned earlier, the (absolute) value
of MFD should reach 0.8 Hz for a disruptive FDI attack from
the grid code in [26].
IV. ATTACK DETECTION, ISOLATION AND RECOVERY
In this section, a detector in the form of residual generator is
developed for FDI attack detection, isolation and recovery. To
do that, let us first reformulate the system frequency dynamics
model in the state-space representation of Section II into a
general DAE description. Consider a time-shift operator q that
qx[k]→ x[k + 1]. One can fit (13) and (14) into,
H(q)x[k] +L(q)y[k] + F (q)f [k] = 0, (17)
where x := [X> d>]> contains all the unknown signals
of system states and “disturbances” (load variations of this
article), y := Y˜ denotes the available system output for a
detector. Let nx, ny and nr be the dimensions of x[·], y[·]
and the row number of (17). Here H(·), L(·) and F (·) are
polynomial matrices in terms of q such that
H(q) :=
[−qI +A Bd
C 0
]
, L(q) :=
[
0
−I
]
, F (q) :=
[
Bf
I
]
.
A. FDI attack detector construction
The principle of an FDI attack detector is to generate a
diagnosis signal to reveal the presence of the attack, giving
the available data y[k]. Definition IV.1 characterizes its task.
Definition IV.1 (FDI attack detection). The diagnosis signal
from the detector differentiates whether the system output is
a consequence of normal disturbances or FDI attacks. Thus
ideally it relates a non-zero mapping from the attack to the
diagnosis signal, while it is decoupled from the effects of
unknown system states and disturbances.
In this article, we restrict the attack detector to a type of
residual generator with linear transfer operations [16], i.e.,
r[k] := R(q)y[k], where r[·] is called the residual signal
for diagnosis, R(q) is the transfer function that needs to be
designed. Considering that y[·] is associated with L(q) in
(17), we propose a formulation of R(q) := a(q)−1N(q)L(q).
Now the task of detector construction comes to the design of
N(q) whose dimension and predefined order are nr and dN ,
if the denominator a(q) with sufficient order to make R(q)
physically realizable is determined. Multiplying the left of (17)
by a(q)−1N(q) would lead to
r[k] = a(q)−1N(q)L(q)y[k]
= −a(q)−1N(q)H(q)x[k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
−a(q)−1N(q)F (q)f [k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
.
(18)
Term (I) is the part from the effect of unknown system states
and disturbances x[·]. Term (II) corresponds to the FDI attack.
Thus according to Definition IV.1, the desired detector would
generate the residual signal r[·] that can be decoupled from
x[·] but keep sensitive to f [·]. We would expect
N(q)H(q) = 0 , N(q)F (q) 6= 0 . (19)
Inspired by (19), the following theoretical result shows an
effective way for attack detection and also recovery.
Theorem IV.2 (FDI attack detection and recovery). It can be
observed that H(q) :=
∑1
i=0Hiq
i, N(q) :=
∑dN
i=0N iq
i
and F (q) := F . Consider an FDI attack in the set (15). A
residual generator with the following linear program charac-
terizations for (19) can have non-zero steady-state residual
output that recovers the attack value f ,
N¯H¯ = 0 ,
−a(1)−1
dN∑
i=0
N iF = 1 ,
(20)
7where the matrices N¯ , H¯ are defined as
N¯ :=
[
N0 N1 · · · NdN
]
,
H¯ :=

H0 H1 0 · · · 0
0 H0 H1 0
...
... 0
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 H0 H1
 .
Proof. Note that N(q)H(q) = N¯H¯[I, qI, · · · , qdN+1I]>.
If N¯H¯ = 0 as stated in (20), then the diagnosis filter
becomes r[k] = −a(q)−1N(q)f [k]. The steady-state value
of the residual signal under the FDI attack would become
−a(q)−1N(q)F (q)f | q=1. To track the FDI attack magni-
tude, one can simply make −a(1)−1N(1)F (1) = 1. Due to
that N(1)F (1) =
∑dN
i=0N iF , the residual signal from (20)
recovers the exact attack value f in the steady-state behavior
of the residual generator. 
Next, the residual generator design becomes to find a
feasible N¯ satisfying (20). To increase the sensitivity of the
residual to the attack, in addition to (20), the detector may also
aim to let the coefficients of N(q)F (q) in (19) achieve the
maximum value. Then we can characterize the attack detection
and recovery problem as the optimization program,
γ? = max
N¯
∥∥N¯F¯∥∥∞
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0 ,
∥∥N¯∥∥∞ ≤ η , (21)
− a(1)−1
dN∑
i=0
N iF = 1 ,
where the constraint ‖N¯‖∞ ≤ η is added to avoid possible
unbounded solutions and it does not affect the performance of
the detector. The matrix F¯ has a similar definition with H¯ in
Theorem IV.2. Thus if we have a resulted γ? > 0, then the
solution to (21) offers a residual generator that detects the FDI
attack and also tracks the attack value.
Strictly speaking, the proposed optimization program (21)
is not a linear program (LP) due to the non-convex objective
function. However, as explained by a similar argument in [32,
Lemma 4.3], one can view (21) as a family of n standard LPs
where n is the number of columns of F¯ .
Remark IV.3 (Attack isolation). The residual generator from
(21) is mainly designed for one univariate attack. For multi-
variate attacks (α?i > 1 from (16)), an alternative is to build
a bank of residual generators where each of them aims to
detect one particular intrusion and keep insensitive to others,
by considering the following “reconstructed” DAE,[
H(q) F−j(q)
] [ x[k]
f−j [k]
]
+L(q)y[k] + F j(q)f j [k] = 0,
where F−j(q) is the polynomial matrix that includes all
columns of F (q) except the j-th one, and similarly f−j [k]
contains all the elements of f [k] except the j-th one. Then
the j-th residual generator can be designed using the same
approach in Theorem IV.2 and (21) for the j-th intrusion
while isolating the effects from others. The j-th attack can
be identified by the j-th residual generator since the other
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Figure 4: Frequency responses of Area 1 under a step load
change of 3 % increase at t = 5 s.
residual generators keep insensitive to this attack. Besides,
with (21), it can recover the j-th attack’s value in the steady-
state behavior of the j-th residual generator.
Remark IV.3 shows that the attack isolation problem can be
treated as an attack detection task effectively. In the end, we
provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the feasibility
of attack detection and isolation.
Lemma IV.4 (Necessary and sufficient conditions of attack
detectability and isolability). For a univariate FDI attack
(α?i = 1), it is detectable that satisfies (19) if, and only if,
Rank
([
H(q) F (q)
])
> Rank
(
H(q)
)
. (22)
Besides, for multivariate FDI attacks (α?i > 1), one particular
intrusion f j is isolable from others if, and only if,
Rank
([
H(q) F (q)
])
> Rank
([
H(q) F−j(q)
])
. (23)
Proof. The detectability condition (22) is adapted from [14,
Theorem 3]. Alternatively, (22) can be rewritten as F (q) /∈
Im
(
H(q)
)
. It ensures that the residual signal keeps sensitive
to the FDI attack but decoupled from the unknown system
states and disturbances. For the isolability criterion, note that
from Remark IV.3, the H(q) in (17) has been “replaced” by[
H(q) F−i(q)
]
in the reconstructed DAE. Then it is easy to
obtain (23) extended from (22). Besides, the condition (23)
can be also rewritten as F j(q) /∈ Im
([
H(q) F−j(q)
])
. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Preliminaries
In order to evaluate the vulnerability and impact of the
AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia to FDI
attacks and also validate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack detection methodology, in this section, we study the
exemplary two-area system in Figure 1 with parallel AC/DC
links and ESS for inertia emulation and provide numerical
results. As shown in Figure 1, there are two GENs and one
load demand center in each area. The system parameters of
the two-area system and the control parameters of this case
study are referred [24]. Given the characterizations of the time
responses of controllers (especially inertia emulators) in the
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Figure 5: Frequency responses of Area 1 under univariate attacks (a) on the AC link, fAC1,2 = 0.1 p.u.; (b) on the DC link,
fDC1,2 = 0.1 p.u.; (c) on the frequency of Area 1, fω1 = 0.1 Hz; (d) on the frequency of Area 2, fω2 = 0.1 Hz at t = 10 s.
time(s)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
F
re
q
u
en
cy
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
A
re
a
1
(H
z)
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
AC/DC system
AC/DC system with virtual inertia
Figure 6: Frequency responses of Area 1 under the multivariate
attacks on both AC and DC links.
high-level structure, the sampling period Ts is given as 0.04 s
[22]. Till this end, we can obtain a 12-order discrete-time
model which can be fitted into the DAE form of (17).
In the detector design, the degree of the residual generator
is set to dN = 3 which is much less than the order of
the system. Besides, we give the denominator a determined
formulation of a(q) := (q − p)dN /(1− p)dN where p can be
treated as the pole of R(q), and it is normalized in steady-
state value for all feasible poles. It should be mentioned that
the parameters dN and p are adjustable for a fast response
of attack detection in the context of frequency dynamics
considering inertia emulation. Particularly, as a general rule,
the smaller the poles, the faster the residual responds, and the
more sensitive to system noises [16]. We use CPLEX to solve
all the corresponding optimization programs.
B. Vulnerability of two-area systems to FDI attacks
First, we present the results of frequency deviations in
Figure 4 where the system input is only a step load change
of 3 % increase at t = 5 s. The comparisons are made on
the normal AC system, the AC/DC interconnected system and
the AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia. We can
see that the HVDC link and especially, the inertia emulation
provided by the ESS, can improve the system dynamics
significantly in damping frequency oscillations during the step-
load fault, which proves the effectiveness of the high-level
frequency control structure of this article.
Next, to evaluate the vulnerability of different system
models to FDI attacks, we launch univariate attacks on the
wide-area measurements of frequencies and AC/DC power
flows separately (recall Figure 1 for vulnerable measurement
uploading channels). The simulation results are shown in
Figure 5. In all of these scenarios, the univariate attack with
the same attack value can cause the most severe “damage”
to the AC/DC interconnected system with virtual inertia.
Comparing with the normal AC system and the system with
parallel AC/DC links but without emulated inertia, the AC/DC
system with inertia emulators is always with the largest MFDs
under each univariate attack scenario. This observation is
consistent with Remark III.1 of Section III-A. In fact, as
9stated in Remark III.1, FDI corruptions on the wide-area
frequencies and AC/DC power flows would affect both the
SPMC control and the secondary frequency control loops as
these measurements are inputs to these controllers in our high-
level control structure.
We continue with disruptive stealthy attacks introduced in
Section III-B. These FDI attacks with optimal attack strategies
can be multivariate to achieve the targets on attack impact and
undetectability, and are obtained by solving the optimization
program (16) for vulnerability analysis. From the results
of (16), an “optimal” multivariate attack (α?i = 2) that can ma-
nipulate both AC and DC power lines with fAC1,2 = 0.44 p.u.
and fDC1,2 = −0.39 p.u. is a disruptive stealthy attack in
the set of (15) for the two-area AC/DC interconnected system
with virtual inertia. Figure 6 shows the frequency response
of Area 1 under this multivariate attack. The MFD reaches
−0.8 Hz at around t = 10.6 s while the attack is launched at
t = 10 s, which implies a disruptive attack as defined in this
article. The MFD of the AC/DC system without virtual inertia
has reached −0.66 Hz under the same multivariate attack. To
be noted, there is no disruptive stealthy attack in the type of
Definition III.2 when solving (16) for the normal AC system.
Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the AC/DC system with
virtual inertia is more vulnerable to FDI attacks.
C. FDI attack detection and recovery
In the third simulation, we validate the proposed methodol-
ogy of attack detection, isolation and recovery. To challenge
the detector, the system input d is modeled as stochastic load
patterns; see Figure 7a of ∆PL1 . The adversarial cases come
from the disruptive stealthy attacks obtained in the above
section. We build a bank of two residual generators to detect
and isolate the multivariate attacks fAC1,2 and fDC1,2 on
the AC/DC links in the two-area system with virtual inertia,
using the approach in (21) and Remark IV.3. The optimal
values of (21) achieve γ? = 4.440 in the residual generator
construction for detecting fAC1,2 and γ
? = 2.649 in the
other residual generator for fDC1,2 , which implies a successful
detection and isolation as indicated by Lemma IV.4.
In Figure 7, the results of the residual generators under
disturbances and attacks are presented. Both detectors have
generated a residual signal for the presence of each FDI
intrusion in the multivariate attack scenario. Besides, we
can see that the resulted residual generators with designed
capabilities from Theorem IV.2 can recover the attack values;
the steady-state residual values in Figure 7b and Figure 7c
are equal to 0.44 p.u. and −0.39 p.u.. The residual signals are
also decoupled from each other and stochastic load variations.
Next, to test the residual generators in a more realistic setting,
we also provide the simulation results where there exist noises
in the system process and measurements. Zero-mean Gaussian
noises with the covariance 0.0009 to the frequency and 0.03 to
the other states are applied [15]. Figure 7d shows one instance
of the residual signals and it still works effectively in detecting
and tracking the attack value of fAC1,2 . In the end, it should be
noted that in these simulations the adjustable parameter, i.e.,
the pole of a(q), is set to be p = 0.1 for a fast response of
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Figure 7: Residual responses under multivariate attacks.
attack detection. The residual signal under fAC1,2 can recover
the attack value from t = 10.36 s in Figure 7b before the MFD
reaches the maximum value (at around t = 10.6 s) in Figure 6.
This indicates that the developed residual generator can detect
the FDI intrusions sufficiently fast in the inertia context.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we investigated FDI attacks on the hybrid
AC/DC system with virtual inertia. We offer an optimization-
based vulnerability and attack impact analysis framework. Our
study shows that the hybrid grid can be more vulnerable to
FDI attacks. We also propose a diagnosis tool to detect, isolate
and recover all the FDI intrusions. The effectiveness of these
methods was validated by simulations in the two-area AC/DC
system with emulated inertia. The future research includes the
study of other types of cyber attacks on the hybrid grids with
virtual inertia emulation capabilities.
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